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Is the Privilege of Private Discrimination
an Artifact of an Icon?

DONALD A. DRIPPS*

Professor Zwolinski poses a thoughtful challenge to the law’s distinct
responses to private and commercial discrimination along the lines of
race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, disability, age, and so on.1 He
considers three plausible explanations for the privileged status of private
discrimination: (1) private discrimination is harder to detect; (2) private
discrimination is less harmful; and (3) private discrimination is morally
authorized by personal autonomy.2 Carefully analyzing each candidate,
he rejects them all, concluding that the legal treatment of private and
commercial discrimination ought to be more closely aligned.3 He remains
noncommittal on whether the right to discriminate in employment and
housing ought to be broadened, or whether the right to discriminate in
choosing friends, roommates, club members, dates, and so on ought to
be narrowed.
Most of what Professor Zwolinski says about the three plausible
grounds for private discrimination’s privileged position seems to me
persuasive. I do, however, offer three observations about the prospects
of justifying the prevailing distinction. First, as a methodological
matter, there are many settled rules and institutions that are, from the
standpoint of moral theory, not quite justified by any single normative
theory. They may, however, be justified pragmatically, when they are
* Professor, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. 1980, Northwestern
University; J.D. 1983, University of Michigan.
1. Matt Zwolinski, Why Not Regulate Private Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1043 (2006).
2. Zwolinski, supra note 1, at 1044.
3. Id. at 1044-45.
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nearly justified by several reasons. The imperfect fit between the rule or
practice and morally justified outcomes in all the cases covered by the
rule or practice may then be of less concern, especially if the cost of
more discriminating alternative rules or practices is likely to be high.
Second, an attempt to redistribute the goods now distributed by
persons exercising the privilege of private discrimination is normatively
problematic. Those currently receiving these goods are usually innocent, so
the loss to the victim of discrimination is a gain to another, unmerited in
some sense, but still a gain. And it may well be impossible to transfer
that same good to someone else who, in some sense, merits it. The
government can force A to admit B to A’s golf club, but it cannot make A
like or respect B.
Third, the privilege for private discrimination indeed tends to track a
widely-felt sense that autonomy has special value in some spheres of
human life. Throughout the developed world, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, and sexual privacy enjoy more respect, legally and
socially, than the right to contract, to own weapons, or to consume
intoxicants. This hierarchy of liberties may turn out to be arbitrary, but
it prevails so widely that I would be slow to assume that it is. The
privileged liberties turn out to protect the same zones of life that enjoy
the privilege of private discrimination.
I.
Suppose we reconsider the legal regulation of discrimination as a
choice between a rule and a standard. The rule provides: “Discrimination
based on familiar identity markers in commercial transaction is prohibited.
Discrimination based on familiar identity markers in noncommercial,
private transactions is permitted.” The standard provides: “Wrongful
discrimination based on familiar identity markers is prohibited, in both
the commercial and the private context.”
The standard is fully or completely justified in the sense that, when
properly applied, it will always produce the right result. Yet it is a familiar
lesson of legal theory that rules are sometimes preferable to standards.4
The case for rules is strongest when the system expects to adjudicate a
large number of cases, when regulated actors have a legitimate need for
clear and prospective guidance on the law’s demands, when the available
remedies for violations discovered ex post are costly or imperfect, and

4. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Colin S.
Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
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when it is difficult to make accurate assessments of the specific facts that
would inform the application of a standard to particular cases.
Professor Zwolinski is right when he says that the law regulates some
aspects of private life, like drug use, that some private discrimination is
open and notorious, and that some commercial discrimination is hard to
prove.5 I am willing to assume that some private discrimination has
more baleful consequences than some commercial discrimination.6 I am
not convinced that these claims exclude a case for the rule previously
described.
Much private discrimination is invisible; one is not informed of invitations
withheld. Most of the goods withheld are modest. I would be the last to
question the value of a good party or a roll in the hay, but I think it also
clear that they have lesser life consequences than university admissions,
job offers, and mortgage availability. Discriminatory exclusion from
long-term relationships, marriage included, is a special case about which
I shall say more presently.
If a legal system were to attempt enforcement of a prohibition on private
discrimination, it would need to craft a remedial system based on private
suit, publicly administered investigations, or both. The potential number
of claims is very large, and an accurate assessment of the relevant facts
would be difficult. “Why didn’t you go out with Jim?” “Because he’s a
dork.” “Isn’t it true that you did go out with Joe?” “Yes.” “Isn’t it true that
Joe is definitely a dork, but a white dork?” “Joe is not a dork. He’s a dweeb.
There’s a difference.”
Ironically, any enforcement mechanism invites discriminations along
the lines of wealth and race. The better educated and more well-off will
have the knowledge and resources to sue. Public investigations will not
target upper class suspects. If we are to analogize private discrimination
and private drug use, we ought to acknowledge that enforcement of the
laws against the latter have not been enforced with an even hand.7
Consider lying, a practice that is always prima facie wrong, but unlawful
only when intended to induce detrimental reliance or when honesty is
required for testimony, a securities disclosure, tax return, and so on. No
society makes lying as such a crime, and yet no society regards lying as
a matter of moral indifference. Some lies are easy to prove, and some

5.
6.
7.

See Zwolinski, supra note 1, at 1047-48.
Id. at 1050-54.
See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT, 109-11 (1995).
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are quite harmful. On the whole, however, a general legal prohibition on
lying would do more harm than good.
So I am not quite convinced by Professor Zwolinski’s critique of the
epistemic and consequentialist distinctions. It might be that, taken
together, those considerations justify a categorical privilege for private
discrimination, not because private discrimination is always unprovable
or always of modest consequence, but because private discrimination is
usually unprovable, often of modest consequence, and generally costly
to remedy. The rule will certainly produce some wrong results, but it
might well produce fewer of them at lower cost than an attempt to
implement the standard. At the very least, reasonable persons might say
that scarce resources for investigating wrong-doing might be better
directed at graver evils such as sexual assault, domestic violence, child
abuse, and so on.
Professor Zwolinski makes the important point that law has a symbolic or
rhetorical function, a significant function and perhaps its primary one.8
To limit the reach of a prohibition to the realm of symbols, however, the
system would have to prohibit private suits and rely exclusively on
public authority. Would a prohibition adopted with the explicit understanding
that it exists just for show have the same symbolic power as other laws?
The example of the sodomy laws is illustrative on this point. The
sodomy laws inflicted considerable harm when used to support civil-side
discrimination in employment and family law.9 Whatever symbolic respect
they ever had went out with their enforcement. The Georgia statute upheld
in Bowers v. Hardwick facially applied to heterosexual oral sex.10 This
was rightly regarded as a joke, not a jeremiad.
Symbolic laws, moreover, remain on the books and will be exploited
by the authorities when the occasion arises. Ban private discrimination
as a symbolic matter, and just wait for a controversial judicial nomination.
“Now, Judge Smithers, we understand that you’re a brilliant jurist. I’m
just a little troubled about the fact that you’ve never had a [insert racial,
religious, or ethnic minority here] over for dinner. That’s troubling
enough, but as I’m sure you know, that’s been a crime since the passage

8. See Zwolinski, supra note 1, at 1048.
9. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
“Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 103, 136 (2000) (“[L]egislators,
police officers, and judges all explicitly rely on the presumptive criminality of homosexual
citizens to justify a wide range of official discrimination against gay men and lesbians.”).
10. 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986) (“A person commits the offense of sodomy when
he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another. . . .”) (ellipsis in original) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2
(1984)).
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of the Zwolinski Act. . . .” Hypocrisy seems to be a permanent feature
of the human condition, but the less of it we write into law, the better.
II.
When A withholds friendship, respect, or love from B, is it possible to
compel A to extend these goods? Some goods, to use Robert George’s
term, are “reflexive”:
Moral goods are “reflexive” in that they are reasons to choose which include
choice in their very meaning; one cannot participate in these goods otherwise
than by acts of choice, that is, internal acts of will, and the internal disposition
established by such choices. As internal acts, they are beyond legal compulsion.11

Friendship is surely such a good. We say of the undercover informant
that he is a “false friend,” that is, no friend at all, even though the
suspect may subjectively experience the feeling of friendship with the
informant.
If friendship is such a good, so too is love. To say that A does not love
B because of B’s race or religion supposes that interpersonal criteria,
accessible to observers, determine whom A loves and does not love. If B
meets these criteria but for B’s race, A’s failure to love B is discriminatory.
Suppose, fantastically, that this kind of calculation could be made
reliably enough for purposes of litigation. Is it possible for A to love B,
even if the cause of A’s inability is a predisposition A agrees is
irrational? Saying “A ought to love B” is like saying “A ought to flap his
arms and fly.”
The law should not command the impossible. If we wish to send social
signals to reduce discrimination in love or marriage, we might consider
subsidies like double exemptions on taxes for interracial, interethnic, or
interfaith marriages. It makes more sense to reward love when it is
lucky enough to be pro-social than to punish love when it is unlucky
enough to mirror the society in which the lovers live.
III.
John Stuart Mill thought that the arguments justifying strong individual
rights of conscience and expression also justified a much broader range
of behavioral autonomy.12 On this point Mill has not yet prevailed.
11.
12.

ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 43 (1993).
JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 5, 17
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Freedom of conscience and expression had a preferred position even in
Mill’s time. Today sexual autonomy has joined them throughout the
modern world in the ranks of what are thought to be fundamental human
rights. Lawrence v. Texas is controversial only on the level of constitutional
methodology;13 even Justice Thomas, who dissented, said the Texas law
was “silly” and that he would vote to repeal it.14
The Court, however, has refused to recognize a constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide,15 or even a statutory right to use marijuana
for medical purposes.16 The Court is not alone in seeing faith, speech,
and sex as special enclaves of personal autonomy. Indeed, in prevailing
opinion and in U.S. law, speech, conscience, and sexuality hold their
privileged status even when they cause harm,17 because the rights to
speak, to believe, and to love deliver benefits in general and in the long
run that outweigh what harms may follow.
This hierarchy of preferred liberties closely tracks prevailing
sentiments about the privilege of private discrimination. In what cases
do we insist most earnestly on the right to discriminate? Nazis in
Skokie; an all-male priesthood; and who goes to bed with whom.18 If
(Stefan Collini ed., 1989).
It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the
general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it,
on which the principle here stated is, if not fully, yet to a certain point,
recognised by the current opinions. This one branch is the Liberty of Thought:
from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of
writing. . . . [T]he grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they
rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so thoroughly
appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, as might have been
expected. Those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much wider
application than to only one division of the subject . . . .
Id.
13. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see, e.g., Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due,” 38
AKRON L. REV. 1, 49 (2005) (“The reasoning in Lawrence is very much of the same
doctrinal variety as in Dred Scott and Lochner, even though—viewed as judicial
legislation—the reasoning in Lawrence is far more reasonable and compassionate than
that of either Dred Scott or Lochner.”) (footnote omitted).
14. 539 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
16. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
17. Cf. Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
18. The ACLU initially lost a great deal of support for defending the right of the
Nazis to march, but that stand has come to be seen as true to the organization’s
principles. See, e.g., PHILIPPA STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO SKOKIE (1999). A
unanimous body of judicial opinion recognizes, on First Amendment grounds, an
exemption to Title VII for employment decisions regarding clergy. See, e.g., Steven K.
Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Funding, and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 23 (2002) (“[E]ven prior to the 1972 amendment, courts began to read a
constitutionally compelled ‘ministerial exception’ into Title VII that allows religious
institutions to discriminate on any basis—race, gender, national origin—for employment
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the present consensus on the right to be let alone holds only across a
limited range of the current hierarchy, contra Mill, we might also have a
justification for an autonomy-based right of private discrimination. On
the other hand, if Mill was right and the current hierarchy is arbitrary, I
expect Professor Zwolinski is correct to say that the right to discriminate
should, and eventually will, cover either far more, or far less, ground.

decisions involving clergy.”) (footnote omitted) (italics omitted). As Cass Sunstein has
pointed out, the Court’s holding in Lawrence was consistent with an overwhelming
consensus in society at large. Gay marriage is politically controversial, but the proposition
that sexual activity behind closed doors among consenting adults ought to be beyond the
reach of the criminal law is politically uncontroversial. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did
Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV.
27 (2004). The overlap between the perceived scope of a right to discriminate, and the
perceived scope of the right to freedom from coercive state regulation, seems very
extensive if not, indeed, complete.
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